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Anomie, System Reform, and 
Challenges to the UN System 
Raymond F. Hopkins 
/ Rising ethnic conflicts pose a serious challenge to the world's interna-
tional organizations in the late 1990s. Public agencies created to articu-
late and implement multilateral policy, especially the principal one, the 
United Nations, have inadequate capacity to ameliorate such conflicts. 
The civil strife and killing in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and the 
Israel-Lebanon-Occupied Territories complex and the continuing con-
flicts in Cambodia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Rwanda/Burundi, Sri Lanka, 
and many other countries are not, or at least have not been, resolvable 
by the intervention of one or a few outside allied states. With support 
from many states the UN secretary-general himself called for a "wider 
mission," the imposition of global authority to resolve such conflicts 
(Boutros-Ghali 1992b, 8). Though the possibilities for intervention have 
increased since the end of the cold war, however, the UN cannot meet 
new responsibilities in this area without substantial reform. 
Two institutional reforms are required. Ffrst, conflicts among basic 
principles and norms guiding international action need resolution, 
particularly the conflict between state sovereignty principles and hu-
man rights principles. These must be reconciled in ways that give 
legitimacy to expanded action by IOs in cases of state failure. Second, 
the capabilities of IOs, principally the United Nations, need expansionf 
In the early 1990s as the UN undertook broader responsibilities iri 
southern Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa, it was critically short 
of coercive capability, basic humanitarian supplies, intelligence and 
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communications, and managerial competence. Without greater exter) ' 
nal resources and internal management changes, the current chal-
lenges cannot be met. Worse still, the UN and perhaps IOs more 
generally will suffer a decline in respect and authority. 
In the post-cold-war era international organizations, particularly the 
United Nations, are experiencing irreversible incremental changes. The 
challenge of intervening to ameliorate violence and innocent suffering 
engendered by ethnic conflicts is but one of several increased demands 
on IOs, and the important role of UN agencies in the former Yugosla-
via, Somalia, and Cambodia represents not merely an episodic or 
"transitional" phase but a real, however modest, step-level change in 
the functions of IOs. 
This chapter does not assess the intriguing question of how the end 
of the cold war has affected the strength or weakness of the state 
system. In fact, it does not even challenge the centrality of states in 
contemporary international politics, although it is clear from the col-
lapse of states such as Somalia and Yugoslavia that the system faces 
difficulties. For example, consider the dilemma of how states can inter-
vene to preserve a state without violating the historical norm of nonin-
terference. One result of such post-cold-war dilemmas is a change of 
attitude about international politics, a growing confusion and disagree-
ment about traditional norms, i.e., a case of "anomie" in international 
affairs. This anomie, as discussed later in this chapter, creates condi-
tions conducive to incremental change in the structure of IOs. 
In this chapter I focus almost exclusively on the UN system. The 
effects of ethnic conflicts on other international organizations is less 
clear, I believe, in part because regional IOs are even weaker than 
universal ones and their features vary widely. Consider, for example, 
the variety among non-UN IOs, including regional bodies such as the 
Organization of American States, the Arab League, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, and nonregional bodies such as the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). 
This chapter argues two theses: first, that the normative order has ) 
declined and, second, that one result has been the overburdening of 
the United Nations. Elaborating briefly, I contend that the cold war 
provided international norms based on structured antagonisms. In the 
absence of these antagonisms, the norms have weakened, and anomie 
has increased. It has become more difficult for states and IOs to recog-
nize their interests and pursue them through prudent action. In this 
·situation ethnic conflicts and other dangers, including weakened con-
trol over nuclear weapons, pose increased threats to peace and stability 
in the international system. With declining domestic support and un-
clear interests, however, states are less able to take unilateral or com-
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mon state-level action against these threats. The result is that more 
states expect IO intervention to solve problems related to international 
public goods. For example, the dominant impulse is to work through 
the IOs, especially the UN system, to resolve ethnic conflicts in Bosnia, 
Rwanda, and Somalia. The expectation of the IO role is far greater in 
the 1990s than any time since the months following World War II. 
Resources and revised normative underpinnings to equip IOs for an 
expanded role have failed to emerge, however. Thus we have a danger-
ous situation. Until an adequate intellectual and financial base is estab-
lished, the UN's response to these shifting demands and expectations 
is likely to be judged a failure. 
Anomie and a New International Order 
Anarchy, the key element in international politics, reflecting the ab-
sence of a hierarchical order and the relative independence of like 
nation-state units (Waltz 1979; Oye 1986), continues largely unaffected 
by the end of the cold war. What changed was ideology. Polarized 
belief systems collapsed, and when they did, the attitudes of millions 
of people about paths towards modernization, the virtues of technol-
ogy, and the legitimacy of democratic practices for exercising author-
ity changed. 
Emile Durkheim described "anomie" as a kind of moral turbulence. 
In illustration, it is the loss of her/his moral anchor which a peasant 
feels upon entering urban life. The morality of village society, with its 
fixed categories for gender and age relationships, for linkage to work, 
and for conferring worth, enables a person to succeed by doing what 
is expected. In the post-World War II global society, bipolar solidarity 
provided such guiding norms. At the international level it reinforced 
norms of state sovereignty, limited UN actions, and gave a reasonably 
clear rationale for multinational policy coordination. Indeed, the states 
of the West and the Soviet bloc, by performing expected tasks, "saw" 
rewards for their actions (George 1983). In current global society, as for 
the peasant entering the city, however, things have "fallen apart," and 
the old normative order has lost relevancy, engendering a search for 
new ways of doing things and a new set of moral and practical rules. 
One key issue is how existing identities and moral systems relate to the 
global spread of liberalism. The individual freedom to act celebrated by 
the liberal political and economic order contains an invitation for ethnic 
groups to assert claims. 
The future of IOs and the resolution of ethnic conflicts will be 
shaped by consequential changes occurring in the 1990s in the subjec-
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tive realm. Identities, expectations, demands are in flux-far more so 
than the distribution of power among major states. There have been 
attitude shifts regarding animosities and threats across borders, most 
clearly in Europe and the Middle East following German reunification 
in 1991 and the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian accord and in Africa following 
state failures in Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, and Rwanda. The identities 
and goals of peoples within many states have also shifted: witness 
changes inside the states of the former Soviet Union, of Eastern Eu-
rope, and of South Africa. Theorists, recognizing this shift in subjectiv-
ities around the world, interpret it differently. One vision sees 
communal-oriented conservatives, in the guise of Islamic fundamental-
ists, neo-Nazis, neo-Stalinists, or the religious right (as in the United 
States), pursuing various forms of international xenophobia. Such 
groups mobilize fears of disadvantaged peoples as a way to counter 
threats they see in an approaching consensus on "liberal" norms, 
which are diffusing through non-Western cultures. Because these 
norms challenge traditional values, they are rejected by anachronistic 
minorities. Norms of exchange and trade based on reciprocity and 
rationality, for example, while consistent with both capitalist and Marx-
ist economic ideas, are anathema to some communal or nonsecular 
traditions. International agreements, whether they be free-trade or 
Israeli-Palestinian accords, are seen as dangerous, for they push prag-
matic action and greater foreign involvement in local problems. For-
eigners proposing global solutions under an IO banner, therefore, are 
distrusted, even hated. Realist theorists are particularly sensitive to 
this post-cold-war phenomenon. For them, narrow solidarity groups, 
demanding to be organized within effective new state structures, are 
the basic new property in world politics (Moynihan 1993), and they 
greet the rise of communal, particularistic sentiments with special 
pess1m1sm. 
At the other extreme are theorists, usually liberal optimists, who 
see the current era principally as an opportunity to revitalize world 
federalism. This group finds in the collapse of the cold war the 
prospect for greater international harmony, a new order grounded in 
coherent, inclusive, and increasingly effective international regimes. 
According to this interpretation, as these regimes expand, particular 
issue areas will be governed more effectively because of greater inter-
national policy coordination, especially through existing ( or occasion-
ally new) international organizations (Young 1989b; Wendt 1992). This 
governance will often occur within the United Nations but not exclu-
sively so. WTO, the European community, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, the World Bank, and International 
Monetary Fund, and other organizations are expected to play an im-
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portant role in international affairs (Ruggie 1992). The renewal of the 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995, for example, is predicted to be 
a major advance, consolidating already strengthened NPT norms and 
enforcement mechanisms. Such "regimes", as the one represented by 
the NPT, will perform an "agency" function, acting as entities to ex-
press behaviorally an underlying structured complementarity of norms 
and principles-orientations that are emerging as part of the new post-
cold-war order. 
The liberal view is premature. The evidence is mixed that stronger 
norms of world order now exist or that democratic values, including 
human rights, are in the ascent. In fact, regimes such as those regulat-
ing trade and nonnuclear violence seem to have been stronger in the 
cold-war era than they are in the 1990s. International diplomatic 
norms, flouted only on occasion in earlier years by Libya and Iran, 
appear (in the 1993-1994 era) to be readily and flagrantly violated by 
Serbian nationalists, Iraqi expansionists, or North Korean iconoclasts. 
Both views face a problem. They ignore the growth of normative 
confusion. Instead, each falsely assumes the existence of a key ingredi-
ent for their diagnosis, that is, that consensus on principles, norms, 
and expectations has become more widespread among the world's 
populace. The struggle over the meaning of sovereignty and the sig-
nificance of ethnic conflict exemplifies this problem. While violation of 
human rights within a state is now less tolerated, norms for action are 
in disarray. Confusion over what norms govern behavior undercuts the 
view of pessimistic realists who see new cleavages between cultures 
(Huntington 1992) and also that of idealist reformers who see the ap-
proach of an orderly new world system. 
Thus with the decline of the ideological antagonism between the 
United States and the USSR .and the rise of "liberal" views (Doyle 
1986), roles for states have become less clear. Improvisation is common 
in international behavior or in mediating ethnic rivalries. This decline 
in clear norms for state policy has led to an increase in the demand for 
international institutions to undertake or legitimate conflict resolution 
among groups. Strategy calculations have become less certain; nation-
states' "interests" are less easy to discover in the absence of bipolar 
cold-war rivalry. Thus, the UN is more readily perceived as the agent 
for defining the interests of its members. It can respond, many believe, 
to the felt obligations of individuals and nation-states to protect indi-
vidual human rights and group ethnic rights. In doing so it can reject 
constructions of pluralist states that violate them (e.g., as in apartheid 
South Africa or the occupied lands of Israel). Thus states and groups 
reasonably turn to the United Nations as a vehicle for addressing such 
issues and as a way to clarify, through multilateral processes, their 
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own interest in intervention, the promotion of peace, and the mainte-
nance of sovereignty. 
Sovereignty Reconstruction and the UN 
Can the United Nations serve such ends in the 1990s and beyond? 
The anomie condition of international society does provide an oppor-
tunity for institutional development of the United Nations. It can be 
the arena for reworking conflicting historic norms, of sovereignty and 
justified intervention to empower the UN to develop operational proce-
dures for managing ethnic conflict. The capacity of the United Nations 
itself to deal with weakening norms, however, is problematic. Evolving 
identifications among peoples within state borders have bred greater 
intrastate disaffection and mutual antagonism. Perceived injustices 
and the competing demands to which they give rise have created an 
epidemic of ethnic conflicts. More established nation-states are under-
standably ambivalent about taking action in these cases, especially out-
side the framework of an international organization. 
Sovereignty has been anchored in established identities of people 
and has shaped the provision of human rights by defining the role of 
the state. Now that these and other important social constructions in 
international politics are in flux, peoples' degree of security and their 
sense of community (see Lasswell 1935; and Deutsch 1966) have been 
stirred up. Previously, these were subordinated to such global con-
structs as revolution, but the removal of cold-war requirements has 
liberated them. Ethnic conflict is basically a product of differential ego 
identifications. Rooted historical antagonisms emerge as the basis of 
hostility among differentiated groups whose belief systems are mutu-
ally exclusive. Such conflict is particularly intractable because there is 
an absence of inclusionary norms allowing for mutual accommodation. 
When new conflicts arise for which historical norms prove inade-
quate to help develop accommodation, anomie is the consequence. 
Consider the "nation-state" dilemma. At least a minimal degree of 
shared global identity is necessary for each state to exist successfully. 
One cannot imagine a world of successful states in which the exclusiv-
ity of each state leads to total anarchy and their roles derive solely 
from domination by force (Kaplan 1957). Thus, conventions, norms, 
and international principles all provide a social context within which 
different peoples, acting through various collectivities, particularly 
states, shape international affairs through various historical cycles (Pu-
chala 1994). Grand schemes of thought, for example, Western liberal-
ism, diffuse around the world to provide the intellectual milieu within 
which peoples and their agents construct new organizational patterns 
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and undertake productive or destructive actions (see Bull 1977; Keo-
hane 1984; Haas 1990; Ruggie 1992). In this milieu, changes in the 
firmness and clarity of norms affect the relative strength and in-
novativeness of international institutions. That is, it is not strategic 
calculation among power holders that inhibits otherwise effective UN 
interventions to minimize ethnic combat or prevent its spread to 
others. Rather, it is the absence of structured complementarity among 
belief systems and attitudes about what procedures and methods are 
appropriate. 
Changes in identities and "interests" attached to shared identities 
are bringing pressure to reconstruct principles of sovereignty. The for-
mulation of this social construct, embracing peaceable order, property 
rights, self-determination (identity rights), and universal principles, is 
under challenge. In its "normal" application, the sovereignty principle 
has sanctioned a secular state system, autonomous from religious 
claims (Ruggie 1993, 163). This secular system, however, was main-
tained particularly by cold-war bipolarity. Recently, newer "interests," 
discovered by peoples released from this crumbled structure, suggest 
that sovereignty rules need reworking. As Alexander Wendt notes, 
"Sovereignty norms are now so taken for granted, so natural, that it is 
easy to overlook the extent to which they are both presupposed by 
an ongoing artifact of practice" (Wendt 1992). For example, territorial 
divisions, many artificial-as between North and South Korea, Soma-
lia and Ethiopia, or Lebanon and Israel-have been seen as nonnego-
tiable aspects of sovereignty for much of the postwar era. Now, 
however, the UN is involved in territorial discussions to create new 
boundaries (in the case of Bosnia) or negotiate new formulas for rule 
within older ones (in the case of Somalia). 
Norms of sovereign independence are evolving, under the impetus 
of pressure to contain the violence of ethnic conflicts and the loosening 
of cold-war ideas. External actors, seeking to alleviate the negative 
consequences of ethnic conflicts, have sought to modify norms to bet-
ter justify intervention (Reed and Kaysen 1993). Responsibilities of UN 
organs have also expanded. Territorial adjustments, once within the 
purview of the UN only in decolonization cases, are now subject to 
UN review. The UN also has a larger role in protection of basic needs-
promoted for example by UNICEF's "Adjustment with a Human Face" 
campaign and reflected in the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. 
Finally, the UN's World Court (at the Hague) has taken on the authority 
(analogous to the Nuremburg trial authority) to identify and prosecute 
individuals for crimes against humanity. These new responsibilities 
are indicative of changing demands on the UN and more generous 
expectations about its ability to play a constructive role in human af-
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fairs. They also show growing anomie in international affairs as realist 
assumptions about states as units and the legal principles of sover-
eignty are challenged (Reisman 1990). 
External Intervention to Support Sovereignty 
As norms are challenged, it is proposed that domestic autonomy, 
supported by the sovereignty principle, does not always override 
global humanitarian standards. Marc Trachtenberg, for example, con-
cludes that "the great powers, having ended the dispute that effectively 
neutralized their collective force, can now set the norms that not 
only govern the nature of international conflict but also set limits to 
what sovereign states can do within their own borders" (Trachtenberg 
1992, 228). 
The establishment of human rights has grown since World War II, 
sanctified in countless declarations and resolutions by the United Na-
tions and other international bodies. After the Persian Gulf war against 
Iraq, UN resolution 688 authorized humanitarian intervention to pro-
tect Kurds in northern Iraq. In light of this precedent, former secretary-
general Manuel Perez de Cuellar asked whether the sovereignty-
preserving intent of article 2 of the UN Charter, which prohibits inter-
vention in domestic affairs, was to be superseded by humanitarian 
concerns. He asked in particular whether "the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, do[ es] not implicitly call into question the inviolable 
notion of sovereignty" (cited in Lewis 1991, 16). 
Sovereignty provides fundamental advantages to people. It creates 
a presumption about noninterference from people outside the state 
unit, thus enhancing the safety of people's lives and property from 
"foreign" interference. It also presumes a single authoritative body or 
procedural code for establishing rules over the people and territory. It 
is expected to protect against crime, enforce contracts, and secure the 
rights of individuals and groups (families, religious associations, ethnic 
groups). Sovereignty assures people that the relationships into which 
they enter will endure for a long time and that expectations of out-
comes will be less problematic. Markets should flourish under sover-
eignty, and incentives should be improved for sharing the burden of 
the cost of collective goods and for the more effective provisioning of 
these goods. Political and legal philosophers have long noted these 
properties. When the government of a sovereign state effectively de-
livers such advantages to people, the "inviolability" of the government, 
people, and territory defining the sovereign state commands the recog-
nition and acceptance of other actors in international affairs. 
When, however, a state fails in these "duties," the socially con-
80 RAYMOND F. HOPKINS 
structed mandate of sovereignty becomes increasingly problematic. 
Ethnic conflicts give rise to such questions. Property rights and indi-
vidual rights of a legal and social nature, when extended to some but 
not all ethnic groups within a state, is a systematic source of tension 
among people. In such cases the writ of the state to control property, 
to allocate resources, to impose obligations on people is challenged by 
"entrepreneurs" representing the interests of disadvantaged groups. 
As these claims are contested, they become associated with protest 
and eventually, if unresolved, with violence. This in turn undermines 
the very rationale for the existence of the mandated sovereignty. Thus, 
states that systematically discriminate against groups within their bor-
ders, as South Africa did for decades against its nonwhite populations, 
give rise to widespread external condemnation and the withdrawal of 
some privileges of sovereignty. Economic sanctions against South Af-
rica were imposed in the 1980s, for example, precisely for its failure to 
fulfill sovereignty mandates regarding the protection of individual and 
group rights, property, and lives for all its population. Legal explora-
tions and explications of human rights doctrines since World War II 
have heightened sensitivity to and collective consciousness of the 
rights it is believed sovereign states are obliged to protect and uplift. 
By nurturing and promoting recognition of such rights, international 
organizations, particularly the United Nations, have helped construct 
a status for individuals and, with less clarity, for groups (see the prob-
lem of less-developed rights for groups as discussed by Milton Esman, 
Chapter 1) which, in ideal circumstances, can be "nested" within prin-
ciples of sovereignty. 
The "sovereignty regime," therefore, accommodates and embraces 
an unfolding and expanding set of purposes and obligations for main-
taining the sovereignty of a particular government, territory, and 
people (Krasner 1988; Wendt 1992). These obligations are a nested 
subregime within the concepts and empirical activity of a sovereign 
state. Their shaping, however, derives from lateral pressure exercised 
by other sovereign states and through multilateral bodies that formu-
late and refine the meaning and obligations of sovereignty (see Ruggie 
1992). The rise of counterclaims within "sovereign" states from groups 
claiming discrimination and seeking relief may lead to the division of 
a territory into two or more distinct sovereign entities, as for example 
the division of Czechoslovakia into two states in 1992. Peaceful devolu-
tion, in the extreme case into separate sovereign entities, is one way 
to resolve an ethnic conflict, a solution not likely to provoke calls for 
external assistance or intervention. Other "peaceful" transformations 
of sovereignty have occurred in the breakup of the Mali Federation, 
which existed for only a few months before it became two states, Mali 
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and Senegal, the dissolution of the Malaysian Federation into Singa-
pore and Malaysia, and the emergence of an independent Eritrea in 
1993, separating from Ethiopia. When, however, group rights have 
been violated for a long period and when state leaders bring issues to 
an international forum, such as the United Nations, seeking resolution 
of the internal contradictions in a sovereign state-usually other than 
their .own-the proper, initial goal for intervention is not to eliminate 
or violate sovereignty but to uphold and recreate the conditions that 
justify sovereignty. 
This argument, put forward by many analysts (see Reed and Kaysen 
1993), calls for an examination of competing impulses of external states 
regarding the affairs of countries fraught with internal conflict. Con-
sider the parallel to the principle of colonialism, an accepted principle 
of international affairs in earlier centuries, which was proscribed only 
in the twentieth century (see Puchala and Hopkins 1983). The Trustee-
ship Council of the United Nations has the mandate to oversee twelve 
trust units and to further the elimination of colonialism. Its concern 
to protect and establish sovereignty for peoples previously subjugated 
by foreigners has principally focused on ending intervention by power-
ful states in the affairs of people separated geographically, linguistic-
ally, and ethnically from the colonial power (UNA/USA 1992). The 
anticolonial theme has been aligned with the principle of noninterfer-
ence or nonintervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, 
which has been a major bulwark and justification for the decolonializa-
tion work of the UN. The virtual elimination of trust units and formal 
colonial relationships (perhaps the return of Hong Kong to China after 
1997 will mark the last vestige of colonialism) allows for a shift of the 
pendulum in the UN toward protecting rights of groups within states. 
Although some theorists see "humanitarian intervention" as a danger-
ous principle and many representatives of recently independent states 
resist or oppose such intervention, the trend is unambiguous. 
It may be necessary to specify a variety of conditions and tests for 
discussion and debate. An organization such as the UN would need 
to review evidence in a particular context before authorizing interven-
tion over "domestic" objections, as it did in Haiti in 1994. Nonetheless, 
I propose these key conclusions: first, sovereignty is not inviolate; sec-
ond, violations of human rights (whether defined by local or global 
standards) provide a basis for intervention; and third, intervention can 
be considered legitimate only after multilateral consideration of the 
specific case and a formal resolution through the procedures of that 
body. 
What options can the United Nations exercise which would alter the 
forces that increase the frequency of ethnic conflict and demands on 
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IOs to intervene? Basically, as I have said, reconstruction of sovereignty 
principles to make the requirement to protect human rights more ex-
plicit could improve the UN's ability to reduce ethnic tensions. Ethnic 
conflicts that arise from constricted identifications and competing de-
mands of people could be defused by reworking basic constitutional 
formulas, altering territorial boundaries, and creating new, separate 
states. In addition the UN could monitor state-society interactions and 
the treatment of people. Altered sovereignty norms would allow states 
to cooperate with the UN in gathering information and exposing 
problems. 
Reconstruction of state system norms to relax the strictly dichoto-
mous view of sovereignty would also make it easier for parties to nego-
tiate. Moreover, reconstruction would make humanitarian intervention 
a norm consistent with other sovereignty norms. The UN already rec-
ognizes the right, even duty, of international personalities to intervene 
for humanitarian causes, as in the work of the Red Cross or bilateral 
nongovernmental organizations. UN humanitarian assistance, even if 
it were delivered by force, similarly would be considered not interfer-
ence or infringement on sovereignty (the domestic jurisdiction prin-
ciple) but "an expression of that sovereignty" (Schachter 1991, 469). 
Already chapter 7 of the UN Charter specifies enforcement mecha-
nisms for preventing threats to peace. These have been used by the 
Security Council to justify the use of force to end threats that include 
human rights violations, notably the failure of a state as in the case 
of Somalia. 
Legitimizing humanitarian intervention, even when military force is 
necessary, is consistent with the goal of developing tolerance across 
competing identity groups. The prospect of this action is, in turn, a 
basic incentive for pluralistic states to maintain accommodation ar-
rangements. Nevertheless, changing international norms is likely to 
be a slow process (Reed and Kaysen 1993), proceeding step by step. In 
Somalia, for example, UN agencies might adopt the strategy of encour-
aging mutually profitable trade. In Bosnia any peace is likely to require 
UN efforts to ensure fairness in legal decisions regulating key elements 
of human life, including property rights and distribution of resources. 
The UN could also legitimately undertake efforts to prevent ethnic 
conflicts, monitoring antagonism between groups and suggesting for-
mulas for reducing conflict. This sort of role would entail a UN pres-
ence among antagonistic groups, for example, Armenians and Turks, 
Kurds and other Iranians, Palestinians and Israelis, Tamils and Sin-
halese, Chinese and Malays, Hausas and Igbos, Hutus and Tutsis, and 
Indian and Spanish descendants in Latin America. 
Of course, structured antagonisms often produce latent rules for 
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collective resistance, which imply conformity by all group members. 
Thus ethnic conflicts can promote intragroup solidarity at the same 
time as they create greater divisions between segregated communities. 
From a global perspective, the expression of such antagonisms usually 
erodes universal principles. Liberal norms asserting universal individ-
ual human rights become subordinated to attitudes asserting a particu-
lar group's rights. Terrorism and torture become legitimate. Universal 
norms are weakened and anomie rises, especially among individuals 
who have multiple ethnic identities. 
Asserting "sovereignty" for each group could reduce these ill effects, 
but only if property rights and other goals are divisible. The redefini-
tion of goals by Israel and the PLO in September 1993 illustrates this 
distinction. An intractable conflict becomes tractable once claims over 
divisible goods, such as land, became negotiable. This redefining of 
sovereignty issues could relieve the frustration of external brokers in 
dealing with peoples who hold fairly deep, irrational mutual animosi-
ties. Once sovereignty is seen as a relative, less absolute condition, IOs 
have a resource for driving bargains. 
In contrast, the all-or-nothing element of absolute sovereignty exac-
erbates the situation and limits what IOs can do. Such norms are no 
longer appropriate for a changed global society. Global anomie, exacer-
bated by liberalism, could be tempered by making the obligation to 
protect citizens primary and subject to external evaluations. Reducing 
sovereignty rights in this way would make it easier to construct a set 
of accommodation rules for collective action by rival ethnic groups. 
External norms are needed to steer those who have been born, raised, 
acculturated, and elevated to positions of leadership in these communi-
ties. Without the continuing pressure of norms and rules from a 
higher, external organization it is no wonder that hostility among con-
fessional communities in Lebanon led to communal violence or that 
in 1991-1994 efforts to reconcile groups that lived at peace for decades 
in the former Yugoslavia have been relatively unsuccessful. As in Africa 
these "states" were artificial constructs, subject to fragmentation. A 
secular, unified nation-state was not acceptable as a solution; other 
forms of social organization, however, were not available. Softening 
sovereignty principles could make internationally sanctioned recon-
structions of territorial and property rights part of solutions to eth-
nic conflicts. 
Thus, altering sovereignty could reduce anomie. Neither of these 
concepts, of course, is a static phenomenon in the social order. In 
recent centuries, rival ethnic groups overcame antagonisms largely by 
constructing arrangements that met principles and norms for the pri-
mary acceptable political organization, that is, the state (Kratochwil 
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1989). Conflicts rooted in history and tradition have proven long-lived, 
however, and when secession is the only option, they have become 
deadly. The effort by external forces to redesign Serbia and Bosnia in 
such a way as to leave but minimal basis for conflict, exemplifies a 
trend toward a larger role for outsiders in promoting peace. 
Ethnic Conflicts and IO Capabilities: 
A Precarious Balance 
The proposed role for IOs in reducing and ending ethnic conflict 
remains problematic. Ethnic conflict in the 1990s between communities 
with "distinctive collective identities" (as Milton Esman and Shibley 
Telhami note in the Introduction) in their competition for scarce public 
or private goods, including sovereign independence, has increasingly 
resulted in violence. I said earlier that such violence calls for interna-
tional response especially when warring groups violate global norms 
regarding the basic rights of "innocent" people and threaten the 
"peace" among other states. In these circumstances demand rises for 
IO-sanctioned "humanitarian intervention" and "peace-making" ef-
forts by outside agencies (Weiss 1990; Johanssen 1990; Lewis 1991). 
My focus on the United Nations as the subject for addressing such 
conflicts is narrower than the general scope of this volume. Esman and 
Telhami discuss international organizations that are both public and 
private, global and regional, diffuse and narrowly functional. As noted 
earlier, I believe the universality of the United Nations gives it unique 
authority to address ethnic conflicts. Regional organizations such as 
the OAU or the Arab League are less able to be neutral in a "neighbor-
hood" dispute. The UN brings other strengths to the management of 
ethnic conflict as well. Through its legislative organs, for example, it is 
able to define the character of conflicts. As a practical matter, the UN 
was the logical agent for judicial action on crimes against humanity 
committed in former Yugoslavia. Another strength is coordination. 
The UN in 1991 established the Department of Humanitarian Affairs 
to coordinate worldwide deliveries of relief supplies to conflict victims. 
Capabilities are limited, however. The UN has few regular financial 
resources for humanitarian or peace-keeping missions, and no military 
arm of its own with which to apply force. Paradoxically, this organiza-
tional impotence often makes the UN more acceptable as an outside 
broker by parties in conflict, at least in certain circumstances. 
The political role of the UN was largely marginal during the cold war. 
Though it was founded in 1945 to further global peace and economic 
prosperity, its institutional value in assisting cooperation and coordina-
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tion among states was vitiated by deep ideological divisions (both East-
West and North-South) and military conflicts outside its purview (in 
Europe, Vietnam, the Middle East, and Afghanistan). By the end of 
the 1950s, with the admission of a growing number of impoverished 
but newly independent countries, the role of the United Nations in-
creasingly shifted to development. \Efforts to settle purely ethnic con-
flicts were largely relegated to ad hoc interventions by individual states 
(Syria in Lebanon in 1975 or India in Sri Lanka in 1989) and to very 
"careful" diplomacy including indirect intervention by the super-
powers (the Yorn Kippur War of 1973, the Ethiopian-Somalian War 
of 1977-1978). Other cases, such as Czechoslovakia (1968), Vietnam 
(1961-1975) and Afghanistan (1979-1988)-to the extent they involved 
ethnic conflict-we~t1 beyond indirect intervention but illustrate the 
exclusion of the UN. tThe Cyprus peace-keeping effort, which did in-
volve the UN, was a major exception. In general, then, ethnic conflict, 
as it broke out in Africa and Asia and even among Latin American 
groups (through the assertion of demands by Guatemalan and Peru-
vian Indians, for instance) was contained or marginalized by super-
power impacts. 
Since 1990, demands for action by the UN have grown (Bread for 
the World 1992), far outpacing its capacity. Clearly the United Nations 
cannot intervene in every ethnic conflict, but it cannot ignore conflicts 
as it could, or even had to, before the end of the cold war. Either a 
new and stronger formulation for addressing these problems must be 
developed, including reforms that empower the UN to act effectively, 
or its powerlessness in these crises will breed disillusionment and con-
tempt. Indeed, speeches and "programs of action" are the established 
forte of the United Nations, and not only on security issues. 
To solve ethnic conflicts, especially those that have grown in recent 
years, their sources must be understood. Some of these, rich, complex, 
and often intractable, lie deeply imbedded in the history of the area 
being contested (Horowitz 1985). Others, however, are to be found in 
changing external circumstances, and these account for much of the 
increase in recent years. Effective techniques to reduce conflicts, at 
least as provided by external actors, particularly international institu-
tions, will likely have to be different from the external techniques used 
by the protagonists of the cold war. Certainly the UN cannot employ 
such superpower techniques as military aid, covert action, and ideo-
logical alignment. Further, at present the UN is not constructed in a 
way to exercise significant moderating influence on contestants, even 
when it is presented with a mandate to do so, as in Somalia from 1991 
to late in 1992 and early 1993 to 1994. When the initial UN effort proved 
ineffectual, the U.S. government offered to send military troops under 
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UN auspices and without a Somali invitation-thus creating new 
precedents. Similarly in the Bosnian conflict, NATO forces, with U.S. 
backing, were added to UN resources in 1993. Such novel action sug-
gests that support exists for new UN modalities that might match the 
"power vacuum" created by the end of the cold war. 
Cold-War Containment of Ethnic Conflict 
--During the cold war, at least within their respective realms of influ-
ence, the United States and the Soviet Union constrained ethnic con-
flict. Limits on ethnic rivalry were imposed by support for the coercive 
capabilities of a central government authority. Such external support 
helped suppress discontent (for example, separatist tendencies or de-
mands for rights by minorities in the former Soviet Union, the Kurds 
in the Middle East, the Somalis in Ethiopia, the Slovaks in Czechoslova-
kia, and the Chinese in several Asian states). In addition, the rivals in 
the cold war provided a universal ideology that denied legitimacy to 
ethnic rivalry. The tenets of Marxism and liberal capitalism legitimated 
the actions of the two powers and of governments aligned with them, 
while their universalist tenets delegitimated separatist claims of ethnic 
groups. For example, the liberal emphasis on individual liberties pro-
vides no basis for group rights. 
The alignment structure of the cold war had a pervasive influence. 
For example, secessionist movements in Eritrea, Mozambique, or Sri 
Lanka (among the Tamils), though recognizably sui generis often 
turned to outside "allies" for material support. In addition, some 
adopted models for national political order were provided by the Soviet 
Union, the United States, or other sympathetic states. The weaker the 
"state," or the more an issue crossed state boundaries, the more likely 
it was that external assistance would be used to repress or ameliorate 
Jhe_conflict '. In many cases where a state could manage the situation, 
whether in Burma between the Karens and Burmese, in India, Paki-
stan, and Bangladesh between Muslims and Hindus, and in various 
Asian countries between overseas Chinese communities and a larger 
dominant population (Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc.), the reso-
lution of conflict was seen to be the responsibility of the accepted and 
"legitimate" nation-state. Sovereignty exercised by a government with 
recognition by and representation at the United Nations was respected. 
The possibility of superpower involvement also encouraged "domes-
tic" solutions to ethnic conflict, for it was often feared as likely to be 
detrimental to all parties. Such calculations alone, it seems, inhibited 
ethnic community members from committing resources to the asser-
tion of rights or to demands for a separate political entity. The authority 
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structure of territorial units created by European or American colonial-
ism remained intact, for the most part, among the new states of the 
post-World War II age. 
~ The strong ideological antipathy and security strategies of these two 
most powerful countries created the overarching structure within 
which ethnic rights in world politics were protected or marginalized 
from the end of World War II until the end of the 1980s (Waltz 1979; 
Mearsheimer 1990). The dissolution of imperial relations within oppos-
ing blocs has overturned long-held expectations and abrogated reward 
systems that had come to seem routine. In many former communist 
states, particularly in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
the changes seem deep and irreversible. Without bipolar structures, 
existing solidarities and rules of conduct for the governments of "non-
aligned states," for example, or "Western Europe," are challenged. 
Many rules and identities even seem anachronistic. Richer states have 
less incentive to provide military and economic assistance to de-
veloping countries. Virtually all normative views about world affairs 
have been affected. The collapse of the Soviet Union has created enor-
mous changes in the structure of influence bearing on various regional 
and ethnic hostilities, creating a "space" for the promotion of compet-
ing ethnic claims and the use of force to advance them-actions that 
previously were held in check by the anticipation that they would 
prove unsuccessful (Moynihan 1993). Thus, while the end of the cold 
war did not create ethnic rivalries, it did open new space for them to 
be played out. 
External pressures worked in many ways. Many ethnic groups 
forged coalitions based on anticolonial nationalism in opposition to the 
colonial power (Emerson 1960; Rustow 1967). The two "sides" of the 
cold war diminished internal conflict in multiethnic states by providing 
material support to dominant but weak groups, as, for example, when 
the United States lent its support to suppress "rebellions" (Leites and 
Wolf 1970; Rothchild and Olorunsola 1983). Ideological principles of 
the superpower contest also denied legitimacy to particularistic parti-
sanship during the cold war. Thus many states-especially those 
closely controlled by one or the other superpower-had support in 
containing ethnic rivalries and bolstering central authority. Ethnic 
separatism was silenced by coercion. The former Soviet Union helped 
the government of Ethiopia to repress dissident ethnic groups in the 
late 1970s and 1980s; the United States supported the Peruvian govern-
ment in its effort to restrain Indian demands. Authoritarian order was 
assisted, when necessary, over democratic movements. In addition to 
direct repression, communist and capitalist ideologies, as noted, pro-
vided ~upport for political institutions that opposed secession or the 
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expression of ethnic culture in the form of political demands. Their 
universalism marginalized the validity of claims based on "subna-
tional" or separate identities. Such subordinated groups, however, 
often carried "hidden scripts" about the evilness of the "other," 
allowing feelings of discontent and hatred to fester while group mem-
bers practiced a variety of noncompliance and opposition behavior (see 
Scott 1985, 1990 ). The recent break-up of Yugoslavia exposed many 
such hidden views or "scripts" among its several ethnic minorities. 
Collective scripts of ethnic antagonism, therefore, whether of Pales-
tinians in Israel or Sikhs in India, were partially repressed, subordi-
nated to global nuclear rivalry between the superpowers. Major 
industrial states aligned themselves to protect peoples within their 
sphere of influence from the horrific prospect of nuclear war and, to 
varying degrees, the penetration of opposing ideologies. Some newly 
independent states-Guinea, Somalia, Cuba, for example-seeking in-
dustrialization, aligned themselves with the "communist bloc," select-
ing a Leninist rationale for centralized rule. Certainly, a number of 
states developed authoritarian rule. Many newly independent states 
bolstered the solidarity of their order through a strategy of trade with 
Western industrial states and economic assistance from them, and this 
formula aided the political security and economic capacity of the cen-
tral state Oackson and Rosberg 1982). By and large the 1945-1989 world 
was one of "sovereign" nation-states making foreign policy decisions 
in light of the cold war; ethnic conflicts were secondary concerns. The 
problem is that many of these states, especially in Africa and the Mid-
dle East, are fragile, rather artificial constructs Oackson 1990 ). With 
external props removed, internal conflicts are less readily managed by 
existing arrangements, as is most dramatically evident in the break-
down of the Somalian state. 
UN Containment of Ethnic Conflict 
Have the recent interventions by IOs, particularly of the United Na-
tions, created new roles for IOs in international order? Is resolving 
ethnic conflicts likely to be an important task for international institu-
tions, particularly the United Nations? And can universalist interna-
tional bodies provide effective external resources to mitigate conflict, 
sufficient to replace the kind of structure and inducements supplied 
during the cold war? 
Before these questions can be probed a review of the demands on 
the UN and IOs to help mitigate ethnic conflict is in order. Cold-war 
factors kept demands on UN involvement modest in marked contrast 
to the surge of interventions since 1990. Demand for containment, as in 
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former Yugoslavia, has outpaced physical and organizational capacity, 
generating high probability of institutional overstretch and even failure. 
The transformation of the UN over the last fifty years from 50 to over 
180 members contributed to this expansion in the scope of responsibil-
ities while attenuating capacity for decisiveness on issues of sover-
eignty and treatment of nationals in pluralist states. 
The limited capacity of the United Nations in the 1990s to contain 
ethnic conflicts is also partly a legacy of the cold war. Historically, 
UN action was predicated on principles of nonintervention and the 
application of self-determination "rights," especially with regard to 
ending "colonialism" by Western states. As a consequence, the UN 
has limited capacity to provide good offices (for example, in Liberia 
and Lebanon), virtually no ability to send in an effective peace-keeping 
force when invited by protagonists (for example, in Angola and the 
former Yugoslavia), or to intervene without an invitation when human 
rights are violated even when there is support by an international 
public to end such abuses (as in Somalia). The scope of action sup-
ported by member governments has been relatively limited. 
Perhaps the most unsuccessful UN effort to intervene in a situation 
of ethnic conflict under crumbling state authority was the intervention 
in the Congo (now Zaire) in 1960. After three years of continuing strife, 
the death of the secretary-general, and its own near bankruptcy (see 
Franck 1985), the UN pulled out. This fiasco disinclined future UN 
executive leadership to promote intervention. It also discouraged sup-
port from key countries on the Security Council to commit resources 
to such undertakings. 
--Another factor leading to a decline in willingness to intervene, in 
addition to the UN's own institutional legacies, is the orientations of 
inembers from less-devel~p~d co_untries. Intervention, even to bring 
about peaceful resolution of ethnic conflict, is frequently perceived 
by new states-those recently gaining independence under the self-
determination element of sovereignty-as a threat to the force of sover-
eignty principles. Proposals in the United Nations to condemn vio-
lence in Cambodia or human rights violations in Chile or to call for an 
end to ethnic or religious conflict in Lebanon or Sri Lanka have been 
opposed by some or many developing countries, which have been 
leery of establishing a dangerous precedent for undermining their 
newly won sovereignty. 
-Prom the 1960s to the 1990s, to the extent that leaders in Western 
industrialized countries or the Soviet Union felt an interest in or an 
obligation to address problems of ethnic conflict, they did so on a 
bilateral basis or through regional organizations they largely controlled 
such as NATO or the Warsaw Pact. In fact, very little effective interna-
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tional intervention occurred, whether in the form of good offices, re-
sources to induce negotiations, or outright threats to deter aggression 
and violation of state system rules. The case of Idi Amin, who came 
to power in 1971 in Uganda, is instructive. This pathological personal-
ity was at once a world-class buffoon and a source of extreme internal 
terror (see Southall 1980). Initial supporters of Amin's government, 
such as many Arab states (with the exception of Libya and perhaps 
Saudi Arabia) withdrew support and assistance by the mid-197os. Most 
of the world viewed the regime with considerable repugnance. Many 
states accepted political refugees. Nonetheless, neither the Organiza-
tion of African Unity, the United Nations, nor even major states, acting 
unilaterally or with independent but coordinated policies, took serious 
steps to end transparent violations of the basic norms that provide the 
very justification of a nation-state. Amin's brief 1979 invasion of a strip 
of land between Uganda and Tanzania provided the catalyst for a 
counterinvasion organized and largely supplied by Tanzania. Al-
though the invasion was condemned by the OAU as violating prin-
ciples of sovereignty and nonintervention, a number of Western states, 
particularly the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries, provided re-
sources ( on the order of a million dollars a day) to assist the Tanzanian 
government and its military in a successful effort to overthrow the 
Amin regime and disband state terrorist organizations. The Tanzanian 
intervention also allowed approximately two thousand Libyan troops 
that had been sent to support the regime to fly home with their weap-
ons. Once a semblance of order was restored, albeit with considerable 
turbulence, Tanzanian troops withdrew. Since 1979, or more clearly 
since Yoweri Museveni took power in the mid-198os, Uganda has rees-
tablished its character as an independent state with diverse popula-
tions and an effective central government. Respect for law, reasonably 
sane leadership, and some semblance of national unity exists in most 
of that country. Throughout this episode, inhibitions kept out interven-
tions by regional organizations, the UN, and the superpower rivals in 
what, it became increasingly clear, was a case of a minority-Nubian-
ethnic group terrorizing other groups. 
In 1994 the atmosphere has changed. Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, An-
gola, and Mozambique are among the major IO intervention re-
sponding to a breakdown of civil order in Africa. Yet in the former 
Yugoslavia, divided into separate states by rising ethnic "nationalism," 
the dominant Serbs have redrawn boundaries by force. UN efforts 
did not prevent thousands of innocent deaths and brutal violations of 
human rights. In Somalia an even more chaotic and capricious decay 
of political institutions has occurred. By 1991 clan factionalism and 
governmental anarchy had appalling consequences for the lives and 
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property of Somali citizens. Among other things, the collapse of na-
tional institutions meant that relief efforts by international groups, 
both private and governmental, were rendered ineffective by extortion 
and robbery carried out by rival political leaders and their largely un-
paid but heavily armed supporters. In this context, the UN withdrew 
in February of 1991 after failing in the initial objective; it then hoped 
for military forces of the United States and other states to enter Somalia 
with the UN-authorized goal of creating a more "secure environment." 
This devolved as the only way to allow emergency relief operations to 
proceed (see Branigin 1992). Prodded by the United States and others 
in November 1992, the UN returned to Somalia in May 1993 with the 
more ambitious goal of establishing a coherent Somali nation-state by 
1995. Attempts to negotiate among the factions a pact for reestablish-
ing the Somali state largely failed and the negotiations required the 
UN to oppose the declaration of independence by leaders of the former 
British Somalia seeking recognition of a new country, Somaliland. 
Thus, no state or international body has recognized this claim from 
the most stable area of Somali territory (although the British govern-
ment quite seriously considered doing so [Samatar 1992]). 
In the face of such rising demands for intervention the United Na-
tions, as noted already, is resource weak. Not only does it lack finances, 
but it lacks administrative capability to deal effectively with ethnic 
conflicts. Thus it is being asked to do something of which it is now 
incapable. The situation is much like that facing the nation-states of 
Africa in the 1960s. There seemed great promise for these "new" insti-
tutions; expectations of their ability to solve problems were high. Yet 
after thirty years many have proven to be failures, owing in part to the 
overextension and subsequent collapse of the state (see World Bank 
1989; Chazan et. al. 1992). Analogously, the United Nations, pressed 
to meet rising expectations, may find itself overextended and behaving 
counterproductively. 
The UN requires greater information, relief, logistical, and military 
resources if it is to be effective in addressing and defusing international 
ethnic conflicts. Its budget for peace keeping and peace making is 
limited. Their costs were about 5 percent of the UN budget at the 
beginning of the 1990s (Branigin 1992a), but such activities are expen-
sive, and more money will have to be found if the UN accepts this role. 
In 1993 the budget for regular operations was strained; hopes to pay 
UN bills through donations were described as "financial bungee jump-
ing" (" As Ethnic Wars Multiply UN Struggles to Meet the Challenge," 
New York Times, February 7, 1993, pp. 1, 14). The costs of peace keeping 
nearly tripled in 1992 from the previous year, and in each case the UN 
relies on special assessments and emergency appeals (Lone 1992). The 
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amounts needed are enormous compared to historical expenditures. 
In Cambodia, for example, the UN spent over $1. 3 billion on peace-
keeping operations in 1992-1993, more than all the funds used for 
peace keeping in its previous forty-six years. This amount, in turn, is 
swamped by the off-budget costs of operations authorized by the UN, 
as in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991 ( over $60 billion) and Somalia in 
1992-1994. 
Regular financial resources are also a major issue. In the mid-198os 
the new budget committee began to enforce a no-growth rule on the 
Secretariat, the central leadership, in exchange for the promise to pay 
delinquent assessments. Thus, even as the Secretariat has been ex-
pected to undertake many new and critical tasks, its budget has been 
flat (Branigin 1992a). In spite of the procedural compromise on budget 
issues between major contributors and poorer states, which have a 
majority in the General Assembly, UN finances remain fragile. Unpaid 
assessed UN dues are over $1 billion with the United States and Russia 
having the largest delinquencies (Ogata and Volcker 1993, 8). Nonas-
sessed or voluntary contributions, based on pledges (usually paid), 
make up nearly half the UN system costs. Of the relief and other 
resources available for intervention in ethnic conflicts, almost all are 
from voluntary contributions. UN appeals for emergency relief totaled 
nearly $3 billion dollars in 1992. These appeals, met by a multitude of 
voluntary donations, have grown dramatically as popular opinion in-
side states has supported efforts to assist innocent people trapped in 
disintegrating states. Funds flow both through the UN and through 
bilateral national arrangements, including overseas nongovernmental 
organizations. The 1992 appeal for Somalia, for example, was met by 
resources from thirty-two states and international organizations. Only 
a portion of these relief resources appeared in the UN budget. 
Another costly capability, military force, is nonexistent, aside from 
building guards. There are proposals to extend the voluntary provision 
of national troops to the UN. Indeed, some implementation of these 
proposals has begun. Training programs have been developed, for ex-
ample, in the United States, so that designated units of the American 
military could receive training appropriate for performing multina-
tional military tasks, that is, develop skills appropriate for serving with 
troops from various countries-for example, learning rules for serving 
within a multinational common command. Such "callable" military re-
sources, similar to callable pledges for food aid, are widely envisaged, 
but the methods and commitments are as yet lacking. Thus in 1990-
1994 when the UN has authorized sending coercive force into another 
country, leadership has been decided by ad hoc national coalitions. 
Creating a truly multinational force remains a great challenge to con-
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temporary norms and practices. Another challenge is combining relief 
work and military force, especially sending troops into areas without 
the explicit permission of a "sovereign" government; recent "experi-
ments" in Rwanda, Somalia, and parts of Iraq have created the 
precedent . 
. Another resource problem is the arcane bureaucratic structure of 
the UN organization itself, a nest of specialized agencies, which often 
compete for jurisdjctiort or credit. In ethnic conflict situations they have 
exhibited their rivalry, jockeying for position with one another and 
debating procedure and responsibility. Infighting among semiautono-
mous, almost feudal organizations, is an important barrier to effective 
action by the Secretariat. Moreover, even the Secretariat has familiar 
aspects of bureaucratic weakness-budget protection, inertia, avoid-
ance of tasks for which failure is possible. In addition, the UN is far 
less disciplined as an organization than most national governments. 
In spite of the complicated bureaucracy, the UN does adapt to 
achieve effectiveness. Consider its institutional performance in provid-
ing food to victims of ethnic conflict. As with most cases, UN proce-
dure calls for mobilizing food and other resources from donors: the 
World Food Program has the prominent lead to do this. Relief supplies 
are then provided to the legal authorities of a state. In the case of 
conflicts such as Ethiopia (1980s), Liberia, Sudan, Bosnia, and Somalia 
this formula is not effective since recipient governments often allocate 
supplies in ways that vitiate their intended purpose, or worse, no effec-
tive government exists to which supplies can be given for distribution. 
In Somalia the UN surmounted this problem by working through over-
seas nongovernmental organizations. The secretary-general appointed 
the president of one of the largest such organizations, Philip Johnston 
of CARE, as a special representative and gave him the job of coordinat-
ing all relief activity among UN agencies and dozens of nongovern-
mental organizations in 1992 and early 1993. In general, the UN lacks 
competency in on-the-ground operations. Following experiences in 
northern Iraq among the Kurds and in Somalia, where effective relief 
efforts required coordinating the activities of foreign military forces 
and voluntary organizations, international bureaucratic capabilities 
have been developed to manage military interventions whose aim is to 
provide relief but this capability exists largely thanks to ad hoc efforts. 
The UN also has weak intelligence capabilities. In the wake of the 
Persian Gulf War, for example; ON-inspection/compliance teams had 
to create, virtually from scratch, the kind of information and control 
networks needed for coordinating and leading overseas operations, 
whereas such capability is well developed in national governments. 
The current cap on the budget of the Secretariat will prevent mainte-
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nance of these crucial control and intelligence features, although they 
are basic to operations needing round-the-clock command centers such 
as the UN has begun to undertake. Furthermore, the UN relies heavily 
on information supplied by national governments. In the past, some 
data, however suspect, have had to be publicly presented because of 
the UN's historical acceptance of the sovereign right of states to control 
information. In other instances, special UN efforts have developed in-
dependent monitoring (as the World Food Program has done for food 
aid) or special commissions have been sent to investigate questions, 
such as human rights in Chile or cases of murder during the civil war 
in El Salvador in the 1980s. Independent information gathering re-
mains the exception, however, not the rule. 
A final weakness in IOs, and certainly the UN, is that separate na-
tional identities of its personnel foster interpersonal and intergroup 
conflict. In considering how the external intervention of IOs, particu-
larly the UN, can reduce ethnic conflict, it is germane to consider the 
degree to which ethnicity within the IOs themselves creates allegiances 
and rivalries. UN staff members have a national history. They carry a 
set of identifications, antagonisms, and ways of thinking developed 
from personal ethnicities and national identities. As a result, their abil-
ity to collaborate is far less than that of civil servants in most national 
governments. In the governments of most states, unlike the "govern-
ment" of international institutions, role occupants share roughly the 
same heritage. The authority of state office, carrying the power to 
tax and punish, is supported by sovereignty norms. Accountability is 
bolstered by norms of civic duty and a common "we feeling" (Deutsch 
1966) arising from loyalty to the nation. UN officials lack this com-
mon ground. 
In the UN there are special linkages among peoples who are Arabs, 
for example, or Asians, Europeans, Americans, and Africans. Ethnic 
and regional ties facilitate quick easy communication; alliances form 
among "ethnic" officeholders to push policies for which they share a 
• preference. This aspect of the UN should not be confused with the 
issue of subordination of UN duties to national obligations, which was 
common among Russians and others from the Soviet empire for many 
years. Often they controlled offices as an extension of their state's 
power, and their role was to serve their state, not defer to the norms 
of an international civil servant. Individuals could be rotated home 
while the office remained in the control of the same state. Much of 
this denial of role responsibilities to an international civil service has 
dissipated with the demise of the Soviet Union. 
Regional organizations, as noted earlier, offer few solutions to weak-
ness in the UN-either in financial resources or in management skills. 
ANOMIE, REFORM, AND CHALLENGES 95 
Consider the frustrated attempt of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) to intervene in the Liberian conflict in Au-
gust 1990. A minority group, the Krahns, 4 percent of the population, 
held power by force and ( electoral) fraud. They were challenged by 
other groups, notably the Gios and Manos. With backing by Libya and 
Burkina Faso, Charles Taylor led an uprising in 1990 which was fought 
to a bloody stalemate. After appeals to the OAU and several other 
parties to intervene went unheeded, ECOWAS sent troops to restore 
order, especially in the capital of Monrovia. After two years of interven-
tion, principally by Nigeria and Ghana, the ECOWAS force had become 
one combatant in the internal struggle. While some ECOWAS members 
continue to support Taylor, ECOWAS troops support a designated new 
president, Amos Sawyer. The UN was initially blocked from consider-
ing action in Liberia by Ethiopia and Zaire (then dissenting members 
of the Security Council); the UN acknowledged the intervention only 
a year and a half later (Inegbedion 1992, 11-33). The Liberian case 
illustrates that ethnic and particularistic ties can be divisive in regional 
organizations and that regional sensitivities can block UN action. The 
prospects for successful intervention by regional organizations in cases 
of ethnic conflict seem even weaker than those of the UN, especially 
without greater resources than they currently enjoy. 
With institutional reform, IOs could reduce the likelihood of ineffec-
tive and impotent undertakings. Furthermore, with clear, recon-
structed norms that made the issue of sovereignty more pliable and 
subject to the collective decisions of UN members, the Ut-J could par-
ticipate in redrawing maps. Such participation would require more 
independent intelligence capability and appropriately skilled staff. Fi-
nally, reducing the feudal character of the UN, perhaps by altering the 
practice of providing separate funding to its specialized agencies, could 
create more productive relationships in the UN system. The resources 
and internal capabilities of IOs certainly must be brought closer to the 
levels needed to fulfill expected tasks if there is to be effective IO 
response to ethnic conflicts or other challenges in the future. 
The weakening of international institutional order is the central issue 
of the 1990s, and rising ethnic conflicts are a particularly poignant and 
clear consequence of it. _Another result is increased demand on the 
_United Nations system to contain such conflicts. Arguably, the post-
~old-war era of global politics may be best understood as the era of 
ethnic and cultural warfare. 
Rousseau's proposal for social order is that people must be forced to 
be free. This is an apt description of the current paradox in interna-
tional affairs. Liberal principles have gained ascendancy but fail to 
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construct sufficient authority for their maintenance. Hence demands 
for new states by ethnic groups claiming overlapping territory for their 
nationhood cannot be settled, at least not peacefully or with hope 
of endurance. 
A major tension exists between the historical principle of sovereignty 
and the call for international intervention on humanitarian grounds to 
end ethnic conflicts. This tension is resolvable, however, if parochial 
elements in the conception of sovereignty are abandoned. Intervention 
in a situation where violations of human rights indicate a lack of the 
guarantees justifying sovereignty does not violate the basic purposes 
of sovereignty. Once a government, although putatively having a legiti-
mate monopoly of coercive power over a people and territory, fails to 
fulfill the basic purposes for its independence, to wit, providing safety 
and fundamental human rights to its population, then the principles 
that guarantee that state's immunity from intervention (under article 
2, paragraph 1, of the UN Charter) are undermined. 
The rise of ethnic conflict, in part "released" by an erosion of norms 
previously upheld by the cold war, has increased anomie in the inter-
national system. Freed from the normative constraints of competing 
ideologies, people have more forcibly asserted their demands for a 
variety of political "goods." In Korea and South Africa more democratic 
rule has been sought. In other, more extreme instances, such as the 
breakup of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and the states on the Horn 
of Africa, demands for sovereign independence have been made. As 
cold war international norms have become less clear and binding, eth-
nic groups have had wider scope to press their claims. 
At the same time, the end of the cold war has created new policy 
space for reconfiguring and strengthening the United Nations as an 
international institution. States and peoples are asking the United Na-
tions and other IOs, to undertake new tasks, including intervention 
to manage ethnic conflict. The support for IO action is a reaction. to 
the weakening of normative structures and the resources dedicated to 
upholding them-defense and foreign affairs budgets that for forty 
years propped up states allied in accord with cold war dynamics. 
I believe that current shifts in demands and expectations point to-
ward a new path for international organizations. Leaders of major 
states of the world and UN officials have urged changes to expand 
IO responsibilities (Boutros-Ghali 1992b ). These include multilateral 
procedures for authorizing intervention, to be backed by additional 
resources for international organizations to use in managing ethnic 
conflicts. Concurrently, IO bureaucracies need reshaping to reduce in-
ternal organizational conflict. Such changes would begin to address 
the severe limitations of IOs, as presently constituted, in intervening 
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in ethnic conflicts. Reconstruction of the meaning of sovereignty to 
incorporate toleration of humanitarian intervention and to recognize 
degrees of sovereignty (rather than a yes/no reality) is also recom-
mended. This normative shift is inherent in the increased demand for 
IO intervention to bring peace in situations of violent ethnic conflict. 
Such reformulation would be one step toward filling the normative 
vacuum left by the decline of revolutionary communism and bipolar 
ideologies. 
